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Lecture 
THE ENTERPRISE OF LIABILITY 
Anita Bernstein* 
PROLOGUE:  ENTERPRISE AND LIABILITY 
In May 2003, I visited Cuba to look for tort liability under conditions 
of iron-fist socialism:  Can tort law coexist, one might wonder, with 
official repudiation of private-property rights?  What meanings will 
“compensation” and “deterrence” and “damages” have in a legal system 
that condemns any individual’s private accreting of money?  For 
answers, I scheduled a series of interviews with Cuban lawyers.1  I 
started out trying to find ones who specialized in torts.  There weren’t 
any.  My first clue about tort liability in Cuba. 
A second clue on the subject would arise after each workday, when 
dinnertime rolled around.  Foreigners who want to dine in Cuba, 
especially Havana, look for paladares.  A paladare is a dining 
establishment, serving dinner only, located inside a private home; a 2001 
news story described paladares as “the only small private businesses 
authorized in Cuba.”2  One or two dinners in non-paladare restaurants 
motivated me to seek out these alternative venues.  They gave a visitor a 
soupçon of adventure along with her best shot at a decent meal.  Having 
missed the Roaring Twenties, I am not sure what a speakeasy feels like, 
but paladares—slightly furtive, unlisted in the telephone book, unmarked 
                                                 
* Sam Nunn Professor of Law, Emory University.  Giving the Monsanto Lecture version 
of this Article, on January 29, 2004, was a joy as well as an honor.  For kindnesses 
bestowed, I thank the Valparaiso community, including Dean Jay Conison; Paul Brietzke 
and other members of the faculty; Valparaiso students, who provided a warm and 
stimulating audience; and the adroit administrative staff.  Thanks also to John C.P. 
Goldberg and Robert Blecker for their insights and comments on a draft, to Howard Fink 
for sympathetic attention, and to colleagues at New York Law School, Alabama, and 
Emory Law Schools—Bill Buzbee in particular—for the comments they shared with me at 
workshop versions of this Lecture.  Riki King of New York Law School contributed able 
research assistance. 
1 All subsequent references to tort law in Cuba come from the interviews that I 
conducted in May 2003.  Because I had to use a translator, knew little about the motives or 
bona fides of my informants, and could never repair my ignorance of Cuban tort law—the 
subject has a very scant literature in Spanish and no literature in English—I use my 
gleanings only impressionistically.  They should not be misconstrued as attempts at 
empiricism. 
2 Dalia Acosta, Cuba:  New Blow to Private Initiative, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Feb. 16, 2001, 
available at LEXIS. 
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as restaurants out front—had the speakeasy air of semi-illicit nightlife at 
the margins.3  The governing dictatorship had reluctantly permitted 
Cubans to open paladares in 1995, following several years of economic 
devastation attributed to the end of the Soviet dole in 1990.4  Living in 
their economically isolated island nation—more than a billion dollars a 
year in remittances from U.S.-based relatives cannot quite prop the 
country up5—many citizens in 2003 needed the cash that a sanctioned 
home-based business could provide.  Demand came from customers like 
me.  We dollar-spending foreigners preferred not to turn our dinner 
plates over to state-controlled establishments, where bureaucrats script 
their menus unable to know what might taste good (fresh fish or 
tomatoes, for instance) several months later. 
Fidel Castro tolerated the paladares, I gathered, but he made it clear 
he didn’t like them.  Their proprietors had to labor under irksome 
regulation.  High taxes on receipts.  No lobster on the menu allowed, for 
reasons unexplained.  No more than a dozen patrons at a time.  No 
workers on the payroll unless they were related to the owners.  (That last 
rule was often honored in the breach, if physical appearances of the 
multiracial ‘family’ personnel were any guide.  I also observed tables set 
to accommodate more than twelve customers.  Cubans were reported to 
defy the lobster ban too, but I never saw any on the paladares’ menus.)6  
But that wasn’t all.  Presumably paladare owners ignored El Jefe while 
they hustled a living in the homecooked-meal business but I, less used to 
Cuban discourse, was struck by reports of his unremitting rhetoric 
against them.  Entrepreneurs, said the Leader.  Profiteers.  Capitalists 
chasing a dollar.7 
                                                 
3 Or the Chestnut Tree Café.  See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 49 (1949) (describing this 
fictitious café as an uneasy place within the totalitarian regime, even though “no law, not 
even an unwritten law” prohibited frequenting it). 
4 For a harrowing, lightly fictionalized account of economic hardship in Cuba circa 1994 
and 1995, see PEDRO JUAN GUTIERREZ, DIRTY HAVANA TRILOGY (Natasha Wimmer trans. 
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux 2001) (1998).  One chapter called “The Cannibals,” depicting 
near-starvation, is especially vivid.  Id. at 354-62. 
5 Guillermo I. Martinez,  Little Notice of Big Money,  SUN SENTINEL, Feb. 5, 2004, at 21A 
(reporting estimate of $1.3 billion). 
6 Theodore Dalrymple, Why Havana Had to Die,  CITY J., Jul. 2002, at 92. 
7 I heard such names from fellow travelers; one print source reports the epithet 
“millionaires.”  Castro Castigates Cuba’s New Rich, TORONTO STAR, Jul. 24, 1998, at A2.  See 
generally Tracey Eaton, Cubans Act Like Old Pros with Their Income Tax System, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Mar. 16, 2001 (reporting government statement denouncing “the cult of 
capitalist fetishes and the mentality of the small property owner”); David Rennie, Cuba 
“Apartheid” as Castro Pulls in the Tourists, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jun. 8, 2000, at 18 (quoting a 
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Paladare quests filled my evenings.  Then there were the days, the 
interviews.  Isolated and hungry for international recognition, Cuban 
lawyers tried again and again to remind me that they were in a 
profession, if not an independent one.  They wanted to lecture on their 
Spanish civilian heritage.  In turn I wanted to ask them about money.  
How do you get paid when you work on a tort case?  (No real answer.)  
Can you describe a typical claim, if there is one?  Which damages can a 
plaintiff recover?  Does the legal system recognize pain and suffering?   
Even socialist Cuba had some room for tort liability, it turned out. 
One paradigmatic defendant appeared to be the tourist whose negligent 
driving of a rented car injures a Cuban citizen.  No sense letting him off 
without paying, Cubans figured, when he’d face liability back in Sao 
Paolo or Calgary for doing the same thing.  The state-owned bus 
company had been sued for injuries attributed to a vehicular defect.  But 
on the whole, despite my persistent questions, Cuban lawyers shared 
few reminiscences about tort cases they had seen.   
What about damages?  I repeated.  Could somebody please show me 
the money?  In a system that does not recognize private enterprise, all 
non-human entities—including schools, hospitals, manufacturing plants, 
retail stores, the dreaded restaurants, the joint ventures that build 
hotels—are part of the nearly bankrupt state, and Cuba presumably 
could not tolerate money-making runs on the national treasury 
(although my questions about sovereign immunity, in response to the 
story about the bus defect, never did get clear answers).  Eliminate 
entities, then.  That left individuals as players in the liability system.   
Which individuals?  I could see almost no payoff to anyone for 
casting any Cuban citizen as either a defendant or a plaintiff.  At the time 
of my visit, most Cubans of means had been off the island for decades.  
The average person in Cuba was staying alive on fewer calories per day 
than the daily ration even in low-income Ecuador and Paraguay.8  The 
monthly wage for most jobs, paid in dubious pesos, hovered at what 
would trade for less than twenty U.S. dollars, with very little space 
                                                                                                             
dissident:  “The government fears the emergence of independent businessmen, who do not 
need their rations, or certificates of political rectitude to get a good job.”). 
8 Press Release, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Zenith and Eclipse:  A Comparative 
Look at Socio-Economic Conditions in Pre-Castro and Present Day Cuba, U.S. Dep’t of 
State tbl. 3 (2002), available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/ci/14776.htm (last visited 
Sept. 14, 2004). 
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between the lowest and highest state-mandated salary.9  Even members 
of the fortunate minority with access to dollars must be virtually 
judgment proof, I concluded.10  (An admirer of la revolucion might have 
noted the irrelevance of tort liability in a different way, focusing on how 
well off a victim of tortious conduct is in Cuba compared to his 
counterpart in the United States.  The guarantee of housing and food, 
however meager, along with decent medical care, certainly mitigates the 
consequences of injury.) 
Tort liability has no job to do in Cuba, I concluded.  No ruinous 
medical expenses for a plaintiff to recoup.  Nobody to recoup them 
from.11  The nation lacks tort liability not for the usual overfamiliar 
reasons—“harmony ideology,”12 norms against suing, generous welfare-
state payments to citizens, courts disdained as corrupt or otherwise 
inaccessible, too few lawyers, and so on—but because it has no money 
and no ideology to support the pursuit of money.  
The connection between tort liability and wealth—taken for granted 
in the rich United States of America, and dramatized for me personally 
in Cuba—occupies this Article.  At one level this relation is so obvious as 
to be trivial.  The American tort reform effort holds that tort liability is 
excessive in the United States because of money:  Lawyers go after well-
heeled defendants, it is perceived, for the same reason that bank robbers 
go after banks.13  Plaintiffs, their lawyers, and those who speak for them 
all do little to refute this contention.  Injury linked to wrongful conduct 
                                                 
9 See Robert J. Caldwell, Time Warp:  A Failed Revolution Leaves Cubans Poor, Oppressed, 
SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE, Apr. 21, 2002, at G1 (“The Ministry of Economics and Planning 
puts the average Cuban salary at 200 to 250 pesos a month. At current exchange rates, 
that’s between $7.40 and $9.25.  Adding non-cash government benefits raises that range to 
between 300 and 350 pesos a month.  At best, that’s about $13 a month.”). 
10 I did encounter one Cuban citizen who appeared to have assets comparable to those 
of a middle-class American.  He was an architect who gave high-priced private tours of 
Havana.  I think he owned a newish automobile, an astounding thing for a Cuban 
individual to possess. 
11 My informants insisted there were damages in Cuba.  For example, one plaintiff was 
reimbursed for a foreign wheelchair she managed to import.  Taxi fares to treatment 
centers have also been covered.  One plaintiff, scheduled for a promotion and tiny pay raise 
just before her injury, recovered the value of the pay raise.  Moreover, one informant said 
in response to my question, income from work in tourism—the famous tips that drive the 
economy and make waitressing an exalted profession—would be compensable.  But as of 
May 2003, the bottom line on Cuban tort liability was:  not much. 
12 LAURA NADER, HARMONY IDEOLOGY:  JUSTICE AND CONTROL IN A ZAPOTEC MOUNTAIN 
VILLAGE (1990). 
13 See Anita Bernstein, Restatement (Third) of Torts and the Prescription of Masculine Order, 
54 VAND. L. REV. 1367, 1374-75 (2001) (referring to bank-robber trope). 
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has nonpecuniary effects, but American tort law and civic culture take 
almost no need of them.  No constituency presses seriously for apology, 
therapeutic jurisprudence, medical monitoring and equitable relief in 
lieu of cash damages, the criminal prosecution of injury-causing 
malefactors, or other remedies without cash attached.14  Money makes 
tort liability go round.15 
At another level, however, the relation is underexplored and 
warrants investigation, which I begin here with reference to a famed 
phrase, “enterprise liability.”  First coined in the mid-twentieth century, 
this term refers to the law-based obligation of for-profit businesses to 
internalize the costs of activities that cause physical injury.  According to 
the enterprise liability hypothesis, these businesses tend to accrete 
wealth, and by hypothesis can afford to pay their own way.16  This 
transfer of wealth from defendants to plaintiffs compensates for what 
injury-causing entrepreneurial activity costs individuals.  Over decades, 
enterprise liability theorizing introduced changes in tort law, of which 
reducing the plaintiff’s obligation to show fault was the most 
fundamental.17  Although contemporary observers have disagreed on 
whether enterprise liability has gone too far—that is, to the point of 
threatening the well-being of business beyond any gain associated with 
cost internalization—they take for granted the entitlement of business to 
call itself Enterprise and keep the word to itself, not sharing it with any 
other institution.18 
In response, I propose a term to complement “enterprise liability,” 
referring to a sector that both gives effect to enterprise liability and has 
become an enterprise in its own right.  At one time poorly capitalized, 
unable to plot long-term or national-level strategy, and unconscious of 
                                                 
14 Id. at 1376. 
15 A similar link connects wealth to regulation.  See Robert C. Clark, Why So Many 
Lawyers?  Are They Good or Bad?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 275, 291 (1992) (“As more people 
satisfy their basic needs for food, shelter, and the like, they move on to previously 
neglected desires.  Suddenly, they want more and better health care; they want a cleaner 
environment.”). 
16 See Fleming James, Jr., An Evaluation of the Fault Concept, 32 TENN. L. REV. 394, 399-400 
(1965) (explaining “enterprise liability” with reference to a belief “that an activity . . . 
should pay for the accident loss it causes because, as a general proposition, each enterprise 
in our society should pay its own way.”). 
17 See infra Part I.B. 
18 See, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of 
Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 163, 200 (2004) (expressing a concern “that liability not take so 
large a portion of the capital of enterprises that too little is left to animate a free enterprise 
system . . . .”). 
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itself as a political actor, the plaintiffs’ bar has now achieved a kind of 
parity with the for-profit corporations that it hales into court.19  It has 
grown beyond its earlier role as an instrument used to reverse a 
tendency within some businesses to externalize their costs onto injured 
persons.  It is “the enterprise of liability.”20   
Just as “enterprise liability” refers to both individual corporate 
entities (such as the Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Fresno, named in 
one famous decision21) and whole sectors (such as product 
manufacturers and its subgroups like the pharmaceutical industry), “the 
enterprise of liability” covers different actors:  individual lawyers, the 
small firms in which most of them work, and the plaintiffs’ bar in 
general, an aggregation that in recent years has realized significant gains 
from cooperation and mutual effort.22  As I detail below with reference to 
                                                 
19 Following the Monsanto tradition, my discussion of the plaintiffs’ bar refers to 
personal injury litigation in particular, while drawing occasionally on the literature that 
focuses more on securities practice.  See Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to 
Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899, 902 n.10 (1996) (noting that references to 
entrepreneurial tendencies in the plaintiffs’ bar began in the securities context and have 
moved to personal injury law). 
20 Using “the plaintiffs’ bar” in this monolithic sense to cover all lawyers who represent 
plaintiffs, from those who collect billions in fees through those who cannot afford even to 
rent office space, receives admonition in Herbert M. Kritzer, From Litigators of Ordinary 
Cases to Litigators of Extraordinary Cases:  Stratification of the Plaintiffs’ Bar in the Twenty-First 
Century, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 219 (2001).  Kritzer argues that spectacularly successful 
plaintiffs’ firms now have so little in common with other plaintiffs’ lawyers that it has 
become misleading to generalize about the plaintiffs’ bar.  Id. at 233-38 (noting that the two 
groups have conflicting interests on solicitation, caps on damages, and fee shifting, among 
other issues of professional regulation).  As always, a reader of Kritzer must appreciate his 
careful presentation of evidence.  He may be right.  But not yet, in my view.  The divergent 
interests he lists are more moot points than live controversies–most of them are not in play; 
none has provoked open division among lawyers who represent plaintiffs–and the humble 
origin of multimillion-dollar plaintiffs’ lawyers further blurs the line between the two 
groups, at least from the viewpoint of the less successful.  See John Helyar, They’re Ba-a-ack, 
FORTUNE, June 11, 2000, at 222.  Perhaps in the future, stratification will become deep 
enough to render the phrase “plaintiffs’ bar” obsolete.  In that event, my “enterprise of 
liability” thesis would still hold, but it would be wrong to equate the enterprise with the 
“plaintiffs’ bar.”  What I later discuss as a landmark of scholarship on the enterprise of 
liability, Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 183 (2001), see 
infra Part III, shares my view that the plaintiff’s bar is more like one entity than two.  Id. at 
207-14 (finding significant ground held in common between “the drab” and “the golden” 
segments of the plaintiffs’ bar). 
21 Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944). 
22 Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of 
Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381 (2000).  Aggregation of 
plaintiffs is not new.  See Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of 
Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 
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the tenets of free enterprise, the plaintiffs’ bar now has as good a claim 
on “entrepreneurial” and “enterprise,” the adjectives, as does the 
contemporary American business corporation.23  Yet despite the esteem 
for enterprise that prevails in the capitalist United States, American 
scholarship and public discourse seldom omit a dash of hostility when 
they refer to the entrepreneurial tendencies of the plaintiffs’ bar.  Writers 
sound a little like Castro railing against the paladares as they attack 
plaintiffs’ lawyers for their hustle, initiative, and bringing to a market 
that which a market wants.24   
                                                                                                             
(forthcoming 2004) (exploring nineteenth-century instances of aggregation).  The new 
condition here is gain for their lawyers. 
23 See infra notes 34-47 and accompanying text. 
24 An early reference to the plaintiffs’ bar as “entrepreneurial” is John C. Coffee, Jr., The 
Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation:  Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class 
Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987) [hereinafter Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation].  In this 
article Coffee, an expert on the law and economics of business enterprises, omits saying 
why the word entrepreneurial has negative connotations for him as he describes this kind 
of litigation in negative terms, focusing on its noncompliance with a client-as-principal, 
lawyer-as-agent model.  Id. at 885-90.  In a later article Coffee complains that at one time 
“the plaintiffs’ attorney was once seen as a public-regarding private attorney general,” but 
“increasingly the more standard depiction is as a profit-seeking entrepreneur, capable of 
opportunistic actions”–as if such an exemplar of homo economics deserves opprobrium.  
John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in 
Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 371 (2000). 
 Numerous electronic searches of “enterprise” and “entrepreneurial” yielded zero 
applause for the plaintiffs’ bar.  For a sampling of uncomplimentary references, see Michael 
DeBow, The State Tobacco Litigation and the Separation of Powers in State Governments: 
Repairing the Damage, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 563, 570 (2001) (defining “entrepreneurial 
litigation” as “a plaintiff’s filing of a lawsuit with a low probability of success viewed ex 
ante, in the hopes of extracting a ‘nuisance settlement’ from a defendant”); Margaret A. 
Little, A Most Dangerous Indiscretion: The Legal, Economic, and Political Legacy of the 
Government’s Tobacco Litigation, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1143, 1167 (2001) (revising DeBow’s 
definition:  “a weak lawsuit with a low probability of success ex ante filed in the expectation 
of achieving a quick, lucrative settlement”); Victor E. Schwartz, et al., Federal Courts Should 
Decide Interstate Class Actions:  A Call for Federal Class Action Diversity Jurisdiction Reform, 37 
HARV. J. LEGIS. 483, 499 (2000) (protesting that in state courts, “entrepreneurial contingency 
fee attorneys can bypass the rigorous review given by federal judges and obtain 
certification of questionable claims and approval of outrageous settlement agreements.”); 
Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, State Farm v. Avery: Regulation Through Litigation Has 
Gone Too Far, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1215, 1215 (2001) (using the adjective to lead with a 
trenchant sentence:  “Entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ lawyers and activist state judges are 
increasingly working to bypass elected lawmakers and impose their own public policy 
choices on Americans.”).  For milder misgivings, see Deborah R. Hensler, The New Social 
Policy Torts:  Litigation as a Legislative Strategy—Some Preliminary Thoughts on a New Research 
Project, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 493, 495 (2001) (“Should important social policy decisions . . . be 
entrusted to entrepreneurial private lawyers?”); Robert A. Kagan, On Surveying the Whole 
Legal Forest, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 833, 837 (2003) (noting that “adversarial legalism” 
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Below I defend the contributions of an American institution that 
offers up the bounty of what enterprise delivers:  wealth and choice.  The 
argument begins with terminology:  To provide a context for my 
neologism, Part I expounds briefly on “the free enterprise system” and 
“enterprise liability,” both well-established phrases.  “Enterprise 
liability,” “the free enterprise system,” and “the enterprise of liability” all 
refer to markets, and so Part II describes markets for the services that a 
plaintiffs’ bar can render.  Part III continues with a description of the 
plaintiffs’ bar as a mature, amply capitalized, and responsive institution.  
This enterprise furnishes two distinct items, or perhaps serves two 
markets:  It provides plaintiffs with legal services, and it gives nonparties 
to litigation—citizens, that is—an array of the political goods they have 
indicated that they want.  Part IV discusses these goods.  Part V responds 
to three objections.  Part VI, the conclusion, compares the plaintiffs’ bar 
with the American institution that most often gets called an enterprise: 
the business corporation.  The comparison shows the plaintiffs’ bar to be 
at least equally entitled to the laurel of “enterprise.” 
I.  “ENTERPRISE” 
A. What Is the Free Enterprise System? 
What do we admire when we admire free enterprise?25  Great books 
and fine minds have pondered the question,26 but for present purposes a 
ready-to-digest synthesis will serve:  Robert McTeer, chief executive 
officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, has posted his own 
composition, “The Free Enterprise Primer,” on the bank’s website.27  
McTeer gives praise to six features.  First is consumer sovereignty, 
which may be contrasted to central planning, as a means to distribute 
and receive goods.  Second, profit:  Human beings are motivated to seek 
financial gain; appeals to other motives are likely to be less availing.  
Third, and related to the first two, is competition:  Sellers and other 
                                                                                                             
creates “opportunities and incentives for angry disputants, organized political and 
ideological interest groups, and entrepreneurial lawyers.”). 
25 Caveat: I do not say that “we,” all of us, admire free enterprise and “the free 
enterprise system;” nor that free enterprise deserves admiration; nor that free enterprise is 
better, more benign, or more consistent with some natural design than its competitors.  The 
purpose of Part I.A is only to describe the free enterprise system with reference to what its 
admirers admire. 
26 See FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, ECONOMIC FREEDOM (1991); MILTON FRIEDMAN, 
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962). 
27 Bob McTeer, The Free Enterprise Primer, at http://www.dallasfed.org/mcteer/essays/ 
primer.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2004). 
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providers work hard to give clientele better deals than other providers 
can offer.  Fourth, says McTeer, is the linking of income with output.  In 
contrast to the Marxist cliché that would give “to each according to his 
needs,” the free enterprise system allots prosperity in relation to what a 
provider can generate.  Fifth is the use of prices to achieve order through 
“the invisible hand”—because markets function to establish prices, every 
individual can arrange a mix of tradeoffs to align with his or her tastes 
and needs.  McTeer concludes with choice.  Even a wise, fair, and 
deliberative government acting as central planner cannot deliver the 
variety that the free enterprise system turns over to individual 
consumers.    
Although this summary is brief, it can be stated even more tersely:  
Free enterprise renders wealth and choice.  The chance to make oneself 
wealthier draws providers and consumers together in a market.  Their 
behaviors use dollars to promote the strongest money-generating 
endeavors and kill off the weaklings.  Selling and buying within a nation 
will tend to make that nation prosperous—as one need not travel to 
Cuba to know (but the trip helped me grasp this point).  Adding choice 
to wealth redeems “free enterprise” from the charge that it focuses 
excessively on cold cash:  Choice gives meaning to human agency and 
autonomy, which all individuals desire.28  Even vast material prosperity 
can feel oppressive when it is not chosen; an individual might rationally 
sacrifice some wealth to get more freedom to make choices.  In fostering 
“the wealth of nations,” then, free enterprise builds not only monetary 
gain but welfare in a broader sense, including the pursuit of happiness 
through choice. 
B. What is Enterprise Liability? 
This term flourishes in scholarly writing much more than in 
doctrine; observers and commentators have renegotiated its meanings 
with little direct effect on the outcome of decisional law, or the fate of 
litigants.  Yet the term retains both descriptive and normative force. 
Below I consider what limits “enterprise liability,” as now understood, 
might place on the formation of “the enterprise of liability” as a new 
term that esteems the plaintiffs’ bar.  I first retell its official story, then 
look at some lacunae in the phrase. 
                                                 
28 Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations:  The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular 
Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1204 (1997). 
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1. The Official Story:  Cost Internalization and Deterrence   
The ambitions of enterprise liability are straightforward:  The law 
should place the costs of product-caused physical injury “on those who 
are in position to pass part of the loss on to purchasers of their products 
or to factors employed in the production of their products (including 
labor and capital), in this way bringing about a fairly wide spreading of 
accident losses,” writes Guido Calabresi.29  Because the system is “more 
expensive to administer than simple social insurance,” loss spreading is 
probably not “the only goal” that the enterprise liability system pursues; 
enterprise liability seeks deterrence as well.30  The first American judicial 
opinion to speak explicitly about compelling product manufacturers to 
internalize the costs of their activities also mentioned deterrence:  “It is to 
the public interest to discourage the marketing of products having 
defects that are a menace to the public,” wrote Roger Traynor in what 
became the harbinger of strict products liability as stated in the most-
cited section of the Restatement of Torts.31  Within the compensation 
scheme that enterprise liability builds, product manufacturers “function 
as insurers against defect-caused losses” by “selling casualty loss 
insurance policies to product purchasers and charging premiums as part 
of the prices for those products.”32  This insurance function works 
alongside deterrence in a two-part endeavor.  Enterprise liability seeks to 
encourage safety and then, to the extent safety cannot be attained, 
impose the costs of accidents on enterprises rather than hurt persons.33 
2. Eligibility to Be Considered an Enterprise   
Although the “enterprise” in “enterprise liability” has always been 
for-profit business, lexicons speak more generally of an undertaking or 
the execution of a design.34  Usages of “enterpris,” “[e]nterprinses,” and 
                                                 
29 GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS:  A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 50 
(1970). 
30 Id. at 54. 
31 Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., 
concurring).  On the connection of this decision and the later Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Products, Inc., 377 P. 897 (Cal. 1962), also written by Traynor, to the emergence of § 402 of 
the Second Restatement, see JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 19 (5th ed. 2004). 
32 HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 31, at 30. 
33 See generally David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in 
Mass Tort Cases for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1879-1882 (2002) (pairing “Optimal 
Deterrence to Prevent Unreasonable Risk” with “Optimal Tort Insurance to Cover 
Reasonable Risk”). 
34 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 293 (2d ed. 1989). 
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“entrepryse” in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, reported in the 
Oxford English Dictionary as the earliest versions of the word, do not refer 
to moneymaking.35  The for-profit gloss on “enterprise” apparently did 
not develop until the early nineteenth century.  Nevertheless, in 
commentary on contemporary American law “enterprise liability” 
excludes not only such potential defendants as charities, departments of 
government, and service-providing individuals, but also what Calabresi 
contrasts as “simple social insurance.”36  
This outcome is puzzling, because nothing in the stated goals of cost 
internalization and deterrence implies that the entity held liable must be 
a for-profit business.  For instance, the government holds a power to tax 
that resembles the product manufacturer’s power to set prices.  Where 
the resemblance ends, it would appear that the government is better-
suited than a for-profit business to achieve the goal of internalization.37  
Deterrence also may be difficult to impose on, or expect from, the 
modern corporation.38   
The disconnect between the stated purposes of enterprise liability 
and the difficulty of achieving these goals through litigation against 
private for-profit business suggests that in order to be consistent with 
what “enterprise” means inside the phrase “enterprise liability,” the 
neologism under development in this Article must describe something 
motivated at least in part to seek profit; it must emulate McTeer’s homo 
economicus.  The exclusion of charities, governments, and individuals 
from “enterprise” demonstrates that enterprises are private, for-profit 
entities.  They have no other defining traits.39    
3. The Passivity Paradox   
The chief doctrinal move of enterprise liability was to ease the 
plaintiff’s burden of proving the defendant’s fault.  In some versions, 
enterprise liability professes not to care whether the defendant’s 
behavior fell short of a standard of conduct; in others, by contrast, 
                                                 
35 Id. 
36 See CALABRESI, supra note 29, at 50-54. 
37 See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE 
L.J. 499, 520 (1960) (noting that among for-profit actors, only monopolists have the power 
to set prices). 
38 See infra notes 129-138 and accompanying text. 
39 For instance, pursuant to enterprise liability a plaintiff can prevail against business 
defendants without proving that a finding of liability would cause cost internalization or 
deterrence, or advance any other goal. 
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enterprise liability seeks to achieve the outcomes of a fault- or 
negligence-based regime—that is, to hold the defendant responsible only 
if fault or negligence reasoning could support the same result—but takes 
a shortcut or two to get there, such as allowing the product itself to 
support a res ipsa like inference.  This second version of enterprise 
liability appears in Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Products Liability, which 
assigns strict liability to manufacturing-defect claims (while rejecting it 
for all other products liability claims) on the ground that a manufacturer, 
whose product deviated from its own design, has demonstrated its 
responsibility for injury.40  The contrasting approach, taking no interest 
in fault, is enterprise liability as seen through the lens of tort reform—
that is, blameless business defendants forced to pay for greed-fueled 
lawsuits—and also turns up, for example, at the end of Virginia Nolan’s 
and Edmund Ursin’s book on enterprise liability, where the authors 
recommend holding possessors of injurious premises liable for injuries 
suffered there, without regard to anyone’s behavior on or near this 
space.41 
These two versions of enterprise liability show that the doctrine’s 
signature move—relieving plaintiffs from their obligation to prove 
fault—of itself says nothing about whether enterprise liability deems 
fault central or not.  Just as the development of res ipsa loquitur did not 
impede the fault-focused growth of negligence law but simply made the 
plaintiff’s job of proving negligence easier, back in the nineteenth 
century, enterprise liability can coexist with the version of fault-focused 
law that has come to us from the twentieth century:  All one needs to do 
is say yes to the Restatement version and no to Nolan and Ursin’s.  It 
appears that the heart of enterprise liability is not a particular stance on 
fault.  What remains?  Plaintiff passivity.  Enterprise liability ascribes to 
for-profit business all the activity in its sights. 
The goals of internalization and deterrence address only the 
behavior of defendants, proceeding as if injured persons and their agents 
have almost nothing to do.42  While the contract-based antecedents of 
                                                 
40 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODUCTS LIABILITY 2(a) (1997). 
41 VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE LIABILITY 168 
(1995). 
42  
Reminiscent of Traynor’s contemporary Dagwood Bumstead of the 
comic strip Blondie, the consumer is an ordinary man, something of a 
dupe, lulled into false security and manipulated into purchases that 
are profitable to a manufacturer. Using a product in his bumbling 
fashion, he risks physical injury, for which he is presumptively not 
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modern products liability law have always recognized the consumer as 
an agent—scholars of accident law, at least since The Problem of Social 
Cost, understand that the plaintiff’s existence, if not her behavior, is just 
as central to a tort claim as the defendant’s challenged conduct or 
product43—enterprise liability theory has never been able to see hurt 
persons as in any way robust.  To the extent these plaintiffs do anything, 
they goof:  They misuse the goods that enterprises supply.  Enterprise 
liability writers do discuss contributory negligence, comparative fault, 
and aspects of the prima facie case that consider user error;44 these 
writings do not, however, consider the strengths of plaintiffs (or their 
lawyers) as institutional actors.  Tort-reform critics have exploited this 
gap effectively, implying that anyone who favors expansive liability is 
either an infant who wants the nanny state to burp him or an abettor of 
such persons:  the spillers of hot coffee, the psychics who feel they’ve lost 
their clairvoyance, and the oafs who crash through skylights while 
attempting burglary.45 
Its construct of the hapless, doing-nothing, good-for-nothing plaintiff 
notwithstanding, enterprise liability could not exist without the force 
that comes from the left side of the caption.  Although its approach to 
multiple-victim injury eases the burdens of suing, it does not eliminate 
them.  Enterprise liability is not imposed on a business unless a plaintiff, 
aware of her injury and willing to assert a claim, connects with a lawyer 
who can get through a sequence of tasks:  The lawyer must be able to 
communicate with the client, execute a retainer contract, prepare a 
summons and complaint and (usually) accompanying memoranda, 
proceed with discovery and pretrial procedure (at which point 
                                                                                                             
responsible. Moreover he cannot, according to Traynor, achieve fair 
redress through the old-fashioned doctrines of negligence and 
contract. Negligence obliges him to prove more than he often can, and 
the rules of contract were designed for sharp commercial transactions 
between equals, rather than between a manufacturer and an injured 
consumer. 
Anita Bernstein & Paul Fanning, “Weightier than a Mountain”:  Duty, Hierarchy, and the 
Consumer in Japan, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 45, 54-55 (1996) (citations omitted) 
[hereinafter Bernstein & Fanning, Japan]. 
43 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 2 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
44 See, e.g., Mark D. Geistfeld, Implementing Enterprise Liability:  A Comment on Henderson 
and Twerski, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1157, 1166-69 (1992) (discussing ways in which enterprise 
liability can take account of the plaintiff’s conduct); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The 
First-Party Insurance Externality:  An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL 
L. REV.  129 (1990) (urging a version of enterprise liability that does not take the plaintiff’s 
conduct into account). 
45 See Michael L. Rustad, Books of Note, 7 CIV. JUST. DIG., Summer/Fall 2002, at 14 
(referring to the “tall tales” that tort reformers tell). 
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“enterprise liability” as doctrine finally begins to lend client and lawyer 
a hand), parry the defensive maneuvers of an opponent that is usually 
wealthier, more experienced, and more able to withstand risk, and then 
manage the case until settlement or judgment.  This path is not always 
difficult but it does require initiative, even in the much-caricatured 
context of class actions where plaintiffs and their lawyers are portrayed 
as something like the flow of a mindless, avaricious torrent.  One 
demand that enterprise liability always makes of plaintiffs and their 
lawyers is to be assertive rather than passive.  This eccentric view of the 
roles of plaintiff and defendant inverts a paradigm:  In litigation 
generally, plaintiffs are initiators and defendants are passive.46   
C. Summary and Transition 
 “Enterprise liability” and “the free enterprise system” both address 
the attainment of material gain and autonomy, or wealth and choice.  
Regarding wealth, the first of these goods, enterprise liability aspires to 
transfer monies from businesses to injured persons who, but for liability, 
would bear the externalized costs of the activity.  It seeks also to increase 
aggregate wealth by rewarding businesses for marketing safer items and 
removing dangers from the market.  The standard tort-reform 
denunciation of enterprise liability as tending to reduce the freedom of 
consumers notwithstanding,47 enterprise liability also advances choice. It 
forestalls choice only insofar as its competitor is laissez-faire 
noninterference:  Compared to any other mode of law-based regulation, 
enterprise liability is positively libertarian.  It refrains from criminalizing 
the sale of dangerous goods or services, and allows providers to pass the 
costs of liability to market-based volunteers, rather than taxpayers.  As a 
form of legal control, enterprise liability chooses to foster choice—the 
options available to both sellers and buyers—rather than override choice 
by fiat. 
The story that “enterprise liability” and “the free enterprise system” 
both tell—juxtaposing providers against consumers, sellers against 
buyers, wishers against wish-fulfillers, internalization against 
externalization, incentives to pursue against incentives to desist—gives 
inadequate attention to a key constituent of both terms.  Preoccupied 
                                                 
46 See generally Anita Bernstein, Reciprocity, Utility, and the Law of Aggression, 54 VAND. L. 
REV. 1 (2001) (exploring the law’s characterizations of dealings between people who initiate 
or encroach and people who respond to these encroachments). 
47 Contributions of this genre include PAUL RUBIN, TORT REFORM BY CONTRACT (1993); 
Richard A. Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 469 (1987); George L. Priest, A 
Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297 (1981). 
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with the activities of for-profit business, “enterprise liability” has paid 
little heed to the forces that kick-start its big machinery.  The focus on 
overt commerce that occupies admirers of “the free enterprise system” 
keeps them from seeing other actors that execute its designs and fulfill its 
ideals. 
II.  DEMAND FOR AN ENTERPRISE OF LIABILITY 
Popular writings that decry an excess of litigation sometimes make 
this proclamation in their titles—The Litigation Explosion,48  The Rule of 
Lawyers,49 Whiplash!:  America’s Most Frivolous Lawsuits50—and sometimes 
explore the theme inside more somber packaging.51  One might ask any 
critic who claims any kind of excess:  How much is much?  Within the 
tort reform debate, the answer seems to be:  More than is in the interest 
of Americans—as citizens, patients, consumers, stockholders, and 
participants in a global economy.  Some tiny sector is profiting, goes the 
refrain, but the national excess of personal injury lawsuits harms the 
majority.  This Part ventures a contrary stance:  Depending on which 
measures one chooses, the rate at which Americans pursue lawsuits 
might be about right, or perhaps much too low.   
A. Demand from Persons in Need of Legal Services 
It is impossible for researchers to count the number, or rate, of such 
events as “lawsuits,” “class actions,” “personal injury litigation,” 
“products liability claims,” and the like that are filed, or adjudicated, in 
the United States each year.52  Methodological difficulties doom even 
narrower endeavors.  Nevertheless, evidence is available to support a 
provocative thesis that Richard Abel proclaimed in 1987:  The Real Torts 
Crisis:  Too Few Claims.53 
                                                 
48 WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA 
UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991). 
49 WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS:  HOW THE NEW LITIGATION ELITE 
THREATENS AMERICA’S RULE OF LAW (2003). 
50 JAMES L. PERCELAY, WHIPLASH!:  AMERICA’S MOST FRIVOLOUS LAWSUITS (2000). 
51 GAVIN ESLER, THE UNITED STATES OF ANGER:  THE PEOPLE AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 
(1997); MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS (1994); PETER W. HUBER, 
LIABILITY:  THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988); CHARLES J. SYKES, A 
NATION OF VICTIMS:  THE DECAY OF THE AMERICAN CHARACTER (1992). 
52 For an overview of the methodological difficulties published last year, see Kagan, 
supra note 24, at 839; the older classic is Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About 
the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992). 
53 Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis – Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443 (1987). 
Bernstein: The Enterprise of Liability
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004
42 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
 
Empirical explorations of the too-few-claims thesis compare the 
number of lawsuits not to the total population, but to the number of 
incidents or occasions that support a tort claim;54 by this measure, 
evidence of underclaiming has been solidly in place for decades.55  When 
William Miller and Austin Sarat used the telephone in the 1970s “to 
inquire about potentially legally remediable injuries” that household 
members had suffered, they found that only 50 out of 1000 such 
instances resulted in the filing of a lawsuit.56  A famed study by the 
Harvard Medical Malpractice Group, completed during the late 1980s, 
estimated that of every 100,000 patients discharged from the hospitals 
under study, about 4,000 experienced “an adverse event” in the hospital.  
Of these adverse events, about one-fourth, or 1,000, are attributable to 
malpractice.  But only 125 patients of this set of 1,000 make a legal 
claim.57 A Rand study found that after disabling accidents, eighty-one 
percent took no action.58  Automobile accident victims—the most 
lawsuit-prone group among all plaintiff classifications—typically file no 
claims.59 
Evidence of underclaiming extends beyond personal injury.  
According to one study, of those Americans who believe that they lost at 
least one thousand dollars due to illegal conduct, only five percent sue.60  
Even assuming a great deal of contributory fault, erroneous perceptions 
about being victimized, unclean hands, grievances barred by statutes of 
limitations, absconding rascals, and defendants amenable to suit but 
without assets, the statistic suggests the existence of unmet legal needs in 
general and unfiled yet valid claims in particular.   
The phenomenon of underclaiming—the gap between potential 
claims and actual claims—can be seen as the basis for a business plan for 
                                                 
54 Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Induced Litigation, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 545, 575-76 
(2004). 
55 See generally Richard L. Abel, Big Lies and Small Steps, A Critique of Deborah Rhode’s Too 
Much Law: Too Little Justice, Too Much Rhetoric, Too Little Reform, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
1019, 1023 (1998) (“The truth, established by every reputable study, is gross underclaiming 
and gross undercompensation of the largest claims.”). 
56 George & Guthrie, supra note 54, at 576 (summarizing Miller and Felstiner study). 
57 PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 12, 13 (1991) (noting that less than 
half of this 125 receive compensation). 
58 Philip G. Peters, Jr., Hindsight Bias and Tort Liability:  Avoiding Premature Conclusions, 31 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1277, 1297 (1999) (citation omitted). 
59 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 571, 594 n.100 (1998). 
60 THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER 
LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 3 (2002). 
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entrepreneurs to reach a nascent market.  Consider the prejudices against 
plaintiffs that jurors appear to harbor.  The typical plaintiff will fare 
better before a judge, and also in his settlement negotiations, than he will 
before a jury.61  Findings that members of the lay public doubt plaintiffs’ 
motives and the veracity of their claims62 can suggest to the entrepreneur 
that the hurdles will be insurmountable, but support optimism as well as 
defeat:  They imply undervalued assets that await business 
development.  Given the size of the denominator—the sum of potentially 
compensable injuries linked to tortious conduct—it stands to reason that 
an enterprising lawyer would pursue the numerator, the number of 
claims made, by establishing that a client’s claim is real, his injury 
wrongful, and the defendants he names to blame. 
B. Demand from a Wider Base 
In a recent essay called Induced Litigation, Tracey George and Chris 
Guthrie depict civil litigation with reference to its “supply,” a word they 
use to refer to resources that include courts and judges, and “demand,” 
manifested in the quantity of lawsuits.63  By their analogy, courts are like 
highways:  Both are public goods that gain traffic when new users find 
themselves drawn to expanded offerings.64  In response to increased 
supply, demand increases.  Although George and Guthrie offer an 
ingenious defense of increased supply that lines up with this Article’s 
cheers-for-the-enterprise thesis, my use of Induced Litigation here relates 
not to normative support but its invocation of the American road. 
The United States of America is famous for both civil litigation and 
paved highway mileage.  While both phenomena get attributed to what 
may be imprecisely called “national culture,”65 the literature on roads 
has been much more candid than the litigation literature about a simple 
revealed preference:  We Americans like them both.66  One need not 
descend to vulgar functionalism to suppose that, given the relative 
wealth and freedom of this country, any feature of the American 
                                                 
61 Peters, supra note 58, at 1290-93. 
62 Id. at 1293. 
63 George & Guthrie, supra note 54, at 547. 
64 Id. at 555-56. 
65 Bernstein & Fanning, Japan, supra note 42, at 49-50; Anita Bernstein & Paul Fanning, 
Heirs of Leonardo: Cultural Obstacles to Strict Products Liability in Italy, 27 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 4 (1994). 
66 Numerous law review articles note the American infatuation with automobiles.  See 
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: 
Commodifying California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1260 n.162 (2000) (citations 
omitted). 
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landscape is there at least in part because citizens favor it, or at least 
prefer it to some alternative.  Uncontroversial with respect to American 
cars and roads, the inference about revealed preference still does not 
have a secure place in commentary about American litigation.  Writers 
condemn a national preoccupation with law, litigation, and rights as if 
citizens have gone astray, opted for a wasteful pursuit, or failed to 
achieve what they really want and should have.     
Offering a valuable contrast to these scoldings, political scientist 
Thomas F. Burke faces up to the taste for lawsuits that Americans 
manifest.  Burke depicts “adversarial legalism,” in Robert Kagan’s 
phrase, as fundamental to American law and government by design 
rather than by happenstance, venality, or plaintiff stupidity.67  The 
blueprint of American government that comes from foundational 
constitutional theory expresses deep distrust for officials.  However wise 
or benign any holder of government power may seem, he must be 
checked and balanced; even in their attenuated American form, the 
prerogatives of European-style royalty must fall.  In further defiance of a 
European tradition, the American stance distrusts government as a 
source of public welfare and wealth transfers.  Thus, the nation divides 
and subdues its governing structures by an array of means—federalism, 
judicial review, separation of powers, bicameral legislatures—in what 
Burke calls a “constitutional theory of litigious policymaking”68 that 
disempowers agencies, entrenched bureaucrats, and public law 
generally. 
“Litigious policymaking” recognizes that even though the American 
constitutional design regards state actors as dangerous because of their 
power, it admits that power is unavoidable and desirable.  Activists 
want to effect reforms, and no nation can endure without some ability to 
achieve change.  For this task, American government favors litigation 
over regulation or a bureau charged with amelioration of social 
problems.  Policies that encourage litigation “nicely match the 
preferences of Americans, who want action on social issues yet are 
ambivalent about the typical tools of the state–bureaucratic regulation 
and welfare programs,” writes Burke.  “Courts and individual rights 
provide a promising alternative.”69  The Madisonian idea of 
                                                 
67 BURKE, supra note 60. 
68 Id. at 13. 
69 Id. at 7. 
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decentralization thus begat citizen-initiated litigation to carry out the 
duties of government. 
Litigation, in short, achieves regulation American style.70  It dodges 
what the American constitutional design fears, and gives payoffs to 
activists and onlookers.  With reference to what he calls incentives, Burke 
portrays a win-win game for multiple players.  Compare the agency to 
the lawsuit in a context where activists agitate:  civil rights or the 
environment, say.  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or 
the Environmental Protection Agency, or its state counterparts could 
enforce rules.  Yet the United States has disfavored the bureau option.  
The distrust for central government that we have considered is one 
cause; related to that idea, Americans appear to suspect agencies of 
“capture,” of having let in metaphoric foxes to guard henhouses.  Add 
some adverse incentives for officials:  Visible to the public, bureaucrats 
know that their actions will not please all constituents.  Moreover, their 
projects need to be financed through taxation, a measure that Americans 
find distasteful.  Litigation-as-policy shifts power to judges—who benefit 
from a cloak of neutrality; they do not carry a provocation like Equal 
Employment or Environment or the like in their title—along with 
lawyer-and-client teams that can diffuse and shift the cost of their 
initiatives.71  
Elsewhere I have complemented Burke by arguing that litigation 
may be understood as a manifestation of anti-feudalism.72  Even the 
powerful are often held to the law.  The weak reach up and tweak the 
strong.73  Litigious policymaking shifts power away not only from 
officialdom but also from the wealthy interests they might be 
overinclined to protect.  The consequences are not all rosy; deleterious 
effects abound.74  Yet a structure to support litigation is in place, solid as 
the interstate highways, connecting lawsuits to a base of support among 
                                                 
70 See Robert B. Reich, Regulation Is Out, Litigation Is In, USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 1999, at 
A15.  Some writers deplore this result.  See, e.g., REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 1 (W. 
Kip Viscusi ed. 2002) (“The policies that result from litigation almost invariably involve less 
public input and accountability than government regulation.”); id. at 9-10 (noting that other 
contributors to the volume find the policy results of litigation, especially tobacco litigation, 
to be lamentable). 
71 See generally BURKE, supra note 60, at 22-59. 
72 Bernstein & Fanning, Japan, supra note 42. 
73 Anita Bernstein, Muss es Sein?  Not Necessarily, Says Tort Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. (forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter Bernstein, Muss es Sein?]. 
74 See REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION, supra note 70; Kagan, supra note 24. 
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Americans—including those who may never file, let alone benefit 
directly from, a single claim for as long as they live.  
III.  THE SUPPLY SIDE:  ENTREPRENEURS 
A. The Plaintiffs’ Bar Changes in the Twentieth Century:  A History by 
Stephen Yeazell 
The middle of the twentieth century ushered in new conditions that 
allowed the plaintiffs’ bar to reach new heights of power and prosperity.  
My discussion here relies on an extraordinary exposition, elegantly laid 
out by Stephen C. Yeazell, to connect these twentieth-century changes 
with the rise of an enterprise.75  
1. New Sources of Profit   
Yeazell begins by noting that “[a]nything that changes the 
proportion of solvent defendants has the potential for increasing the 
proportion of lawsuits to liability-producing events.”76  As he details, 
solvent defendants flourished during the twentieth century.  The 
postwar housing boom, along with greater government support for 
mortgages, meant that more households came to own the homes in 
which they lived.77  As a condition for lending, the government required 
homeowners to buy homeowner’s insurance, which after the war had 
come to include liability coverage.78  Similarly, automobile lenders 
universally require insurance.79  Federal tax law encourages the 
furnishing of health insurance to workers,80 and a rise in affluence 
fostered an increase in the proportion of Americans who held this 
insurance.  Although health insurance would appear to discourage 
rather than encourage suing, it served as an inducement to litigation:  An 
injured person could run up medical bills knowing that the collateral 
source rule would permit recovering from a defendant, and this increase 
                                                 
75 Yeazell, supra note 20. One need not be delighted with the outcome of this history to 
esteem Yeazell’s work:  Re-Financing Civil Litigation has won praise from a noted critic of 
the enterprise of liability.  Lester Brickman, The Market for Contingent-Fee Financed Tort 
Litigation:  Is It Price Competitive?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 65, 67 n.3 (2003) (calling Yeazell’s 
article “a remarkable analysis”). 
76 Yeazell, supra note 20, at 186-87. 
77 The figure in 2000 was 67%, up from 45% in 1920.  Id. at 187. 
78 Id. at 187-88. 
79 Id. at 188. 
80 On the significance of this point see Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage:  A 
Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129, 172-73 (2003). 
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in the size of the tab made contingent-fee lawsuits more attractive.81  
These changes look quaintly small through a post-tobacco litigation lens, 
but they moved wealth around enough to enable more lawyers to make 
a living in personal injury work.  
2. Profitable Changes in Substantive Law   
While defendants worth suing grew in number, doctrine changed to 
increase the potential payoff per claim.  The rise of strict products 
liability in the 1960s gave plaintiffs’ lawyers incentives to invest in 
specialized knowledge about, for example, automobile design, or 
adverse effects attributable to prescription drugs.82  Longtime 
immunities came to an end, opening up new vistas into hospital and 
government treasuries.83 When comparative fault grew to supersede 
contributory negligence, claims that would have been dead on arrival 
revived.  Yeazell recalls here “the secondary defendant,” a phrase of the 
late Gary Schwartz—a new being formed in response to these three 
developments.  Once substantive law was liberalized, it became possible 
for a plaintiffs’ lawyer to reach the coffers of a relatively remote, 
relatively faultless, and relatively well-heeled entity defendant.84 
3. Profitable (at least in the longer run) Changes in Procedural Law    
Until 1938, Yeazell explains, civil litigation had been “what criminal 
litigation is today—essentially a trial practice,” but then the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure “moved the focus of civil litigation from the 
back to the front of the lawsuit.”85  Discovery took center stage.  This 
shift at first gave new bounty to the defense side rather than the plaintiff:  
Because of the delays that discovery occasions, making discovery more 
elaborate and significant would tend to favor the well-capitalized.  The 
1938 rules and their state-law counterparts could have crushed the 
plaintiffs’ bar.  Undoubtedly, they did help destroy some practitioners’ 
careers.  But the move from trial to discovery is also a source of 
enrichment for plaintiffs’ lawyers that can afford to take the long view:  
Bureaucracies yield paper trails, if one can keep looking.86  Discovery 
produced bounty.  Herbert Kritzer’s division of “the plaintiffs’ bar” into 
                                                 
81 Yeazell, supra note 20, at 186-90. 
82 Id. at 190-91. 
83 Id. at 191-92. 
84 Id. at 192-93 (referring to a conversation that Yeazell had with Schwartz in May 2001, 
shortly before Schwartz’s death). 
85 Id. at 194. 
86 Id. at 195. 
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subgroups bears mention here:  An external development can hurt one 
sector of this cohort while enriching another.87 The ascendancy of 
discovery ultimately became a source of wealth to the plaintiffs’ side. 
4. Meanwhile, the Defense Rests . . . . 
Although these twentieth-century changes that “either rewarded or 
required increased investment by plaintiffs’ law firms”88 did not come at 
the direct expense of the defense bar, they contributed to a shrinking of 
resources available to defendants in many types of litigation—
particularly those that insurers regard as routine or recurring, such as 
automobile cases.  Yeazell reports a rise in constraints on defense costs:  
Today attorneys’ fees, expert witness expenses, and even the quantity of 
research authorized have all been trimmed.89  Such constraints virtually 
disappear in high-profile, bet-the-company litigation, but play a big 
enough role in ordinary work that a plaintiff can sometimes outgun a 
defendant.90 
These developments are of particular interest to those who keep in 
mind “free enterprise” and “enterprise liability.”  According to Yeazell’s 
dichotomy, one sector—the plaintiffs’ bar—follows the money, moves in 
response to new (substantive and procedural) frontiers, makes rational 
investments (in discovery), and diversifies its portfolio with a variety of 
claims.  The other side—the defense—may well be thriving away from 
its lawsuits; from the vantage point of its attorneys, however, it fails to 
grow, must react rather than initiate, and lives under cost-cutting and 
drab middle-management oversight.  If the hallmarks of enterprise are 
indeed wealth and choice,91 then it seems perverse to restrict that word 
and its adjectival forms to the second group.  “Enterprise liability” for a 
stagnant bureaucracy may not be quite a contradiction in terms, but it 
certainly invites a complementary coinage to re-describe the opposite 
side. 
B. The Enterprise of Liability Flexes Its Muscle 
Continuing to follow along with Professor Yeazell, we now consider 
how changes in the structure of plaintiffs’ firms permitted them to 
                                                 
87 See Kritzer, supra note 20 (describing the plaintiffs’ bar). 
88 Yeazell, supra note 20, at 197. 
89 Id. at 197-98. 
90 Id. at 198. 
91 See supra Part I.A; infra Part IV.A.1-2. 
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exploit the new substantive law, procedural law, and demographics just 
noted.  The late twentieth century brought to the plaintiffs’ bar 
“aggregation, marketing, specialization, and diversification.”92  
Professional responsibility codes began to tolerate advertising and some 
kinds of solicitation, allowing lawyers to reach more prospective 
clients.93  Specialization allowed lawyers to invest in their own human 
capital and increased the power of networks; a plaintiffs’ lawyer in a 
particular field could gain clients through referrals from general 
practitioners.94  New sources of credit arose:  After banks began to lend 
money to plaintiffs’ firms that could present a good enough business 
plan, satellite businesses arose to lend money to plaintiffs on a no-
recourse basis, using their legal claims as collateral.95  
The enterprise of liability has received particular attention from its 
gains in the 1998 national tobacco settlement, where private attorneys 
contracted with state governments to gain lucrative contingent fees.  Less 
than twenty years after the Minnesota Supreme Court shocked the 
products liability bar and public onlookers—and went where no state 
supreme court had gone before—by upholding a jury’s million-dollar 
punitive damages award,96 the tobacco lawsuits crossed the threshold 
into what Herbert Kritzer has called litigation in “twelve figures.”97  
                                                 
92 Yeazell, supra note 20, at 199 (italics and capitalization omitted). 
93 Id. at 201.  One might also note the liberalization of fee-splitting rules during the 
1980s.  Compare ABA MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107 (1970) (prohibiting 
lawyers from splitting fees unless the division is consistent with the relative contributions 
of each lawyer) with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.1.5(e)(1) (1983) (permitting 
divisions of fees not in “proportion to the services performed” if “each lawyer assumes 
joint responsibility for the representation,” a more lenient standard).  Without discussing 
these rules, Yeazell mentions fee-splitting as a source of growth for the enterprise of 
liability.  Yeazell, supra note 20, at 202-03. 
94 Id. at 203. 
95 Id. at 204 (describing this “emerging” field with reference to one individual 
entrepreneur, Perry Walton).  The business has grown in the years since the publication of 
Yeazell’s article in 2001.  See Christina Merrill, Judgment Call:  Firms That Lend to Personal-
Injury Plaintiffs Take Steps to Improve Their Bad-Guy Image, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., Jan. 27, 2003, at 
1 (describing the maturation of the industry with reference to the loan that Abner Louima 
took out and repaid, using his much-publicized settlement of $8.75 million for his police 
brutality lawsuit against the city of New York). 
96 Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W. 2d 727 (Minn. 1980).  On the decision as a 
landmark, see Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages 
Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269, 271 n.6 (1983) (citing other cases that involved large punitive 
damages awards: the awards that exceeded $1 million either came after Gryc, or were 
struck down by appellate courts). 
97 Kritzer, supra note 20, at 227 (noting the $206,000,000,000 national settlement and a 
punitive damages award of $145,000,000,000).  Others price the tobacco settlement at $246 
billion, leaving Kritzer’s point undisturbed.  Jonathan Saltzman, Suit on Light and Low-Tar 
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Arbitration panels awarded the tobacco-settlement lawyers a total of $15 
billion in fees.98  In May 2004, a New York appellate panel, reversing a 
lower court decision, upheld a fee of $1.3 billion to one firm-like 
consortium of tobacco lawyers.99 
Successful tobacco-litigation entrepreneurs have chosen to plow 
their unprecedented revenues into new litigation ventures.100  Soon after 
the tobacco settlement was signed, one leader from the plaintiffs’ bar, 
Richard Scruggs, announced that health maintenance organizations 
would be his next target.101 A Charleston newspaper detailed litigator 
Ronald Motley’s decision to spend millions of dollars in legal action 
pursuing funds held by the terrorist group al-Qaida, following 
expenditures he had made on litigation against HMOs and lead paint 
defendants.102  “As surely as entrepreneurs need to start new businesses, 
these lawyers need to launch new cases and causes,” concluded a 
Fortune magazine story in 2000.  “In fact you could say that what they 
do is, in its own way, a form of risk-capital entrepreneurialism.”103 
More significant than the tobacco-money glitter and splash has been 
the power of the workday plaintiffs’ bar to achieve capitalization.104  The 
decline of the solo practitioner helped to foster this change.  In the late 
twentieth century, as Yeazell explains, “the mean and median lawyer” in 
the United States ceased working solo and began to be found in a small 
firm.105  When individual lawyers acquired this opportunity to invest in 
firm-specific capital rather than remain restricted to their own 
reputations and careers, they could exploit niches, refer and be referred, 
                                                                                                             
Cigarettes Heads to SJC, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 5, 2004, at A1; Richard Willing, Lawsuits Target 
Alcohol Industry; Ad Campaigns Are Aimed at Underage Drinkers, Lawyers Say in Cases Similar 
to Tobacco Litigation, USA TODAY, May 14, 2004, at 3A. 
98 Susan Beck, Giveback Time? Republican Senators Get Their Way, AM. LAW., Aug. 2003, 
available at LEXIS. 
99 Tom Perrotta, $1.3 Bilion. Legal Fee Upheld in California Tobacco Case, N.Y.L.J., May 19, 
2004, at 1.  This one was the only fee award that the industry defendants had challenged.  
Id. 
100 Some observers prefer to focus on the entrepreneurs’ personal wealth.  Beck, supra 
note 98 (noting that Senator Jon Kyl, sponsor of federal legislation to limit contingent fees 
and take back some fees already paid to tobacco lawyers, called his proposed law the “one 
yacht” bill). 
101 Helyar, supra note 20. 
102 Tony Bartelme, The King of Torts vs. al-Qaida Inc., CHARLESTON POST & COURIER, June 
22, 2003, at 1A. 
103 Helyar, supra note 20. 
104 Yeazell speaks of “what the drab and the golden share: litigation as investment.”  
Yeazell, supra note 20, at 212 (italics and capitalization omitted). 
105 Id. at 199. 
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improve their returns to scale, and “hedge their bets by combining 
complex, high-risk, high-payout cases with simple, lower-risk, lower-
payout cases that pay the rent while waiting for the larger ships to come 
in.”106  Embodiments of the enterprise from the “golden” side include 
individuals like David Boies, who could cross to the plaintiffs’ side from 
white-shoe eminence Cravath Swaine and Moore in 1997 without 
relinquishing the business plans and office layouts in which he had built 
his career;107 investment opportunities like litigation financing,108 
“litigation bonds,”109 and of course one litigation so big that most state 
governments eagerly bought stock in it, bringing profit to their treasuries 
alongside the profits that lawyers made.110  For the enterprise of liability, 
as Yeazell sums up, litigation has become “an investment portfolio in 
which the task is to manage and spread risks, maximizing gains, and 
insuring and reinsuring against losses.”111    
IV.  GOODS DELIVERED 
Civil-justice scholar Marc Galanter has praised litigation for offering 
“not only benefits to the winning party (compensation, vindication, etc.), 
but to the loser (his ‘day in court’), to others who might have been 
victimized by the loser (through incapacitation, rehabilitation, special 
deterrence), as well as effects on wider audiences (general deterrence, 
moral validation, channeling, habituation . . . ).”112  I expand on these 
ideas with reference to the criteria of wealth and choice.  If wealth and 
choice are the markers of what free enterprise renders, then the 
plaintiffs’ bar warrants a place as a constituent of “the free enterprise 
system,” rather than one of its antagonists.113  Its furnishing of wealth 
and choice to one set of clients—injured persons—seems hard to deny.  
                                                 
106 Id. at 200. 
107 Adam Bryant, A David (Boies) vs. Goliaths:  Microsoft Is Just One of His High-Profile Cases, 
NEWSWEEK, June 12, 2000, at 50. 
108 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
109 See Pierre Lemieux, Smoke-Filled Rooms:  A Postmortem on the Tobacco Deal, INDEP. REV., 
Jan. 1, 2004, available at LEXIS (reviewing W. Kip Viscusi, Smoke-Filled Rooms (2002), which 
describes these bonds that allow tobacco lawyers to securitize future income from the 
settlement). 
110 Yeazell, supra note 20, at 210 (describing the tobacco litigation as an investment that 
featured “pooling of resources and sharing of risk”). 
111 Id. at 212. 
112 Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., American Law Institute Study on Paths to a “Better Way:”  
Litigation, Alternatives, Accommodation, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 845-46 (quoting MARC 
GALANTER, THE RADIATING EFFECTS OF COURTS, IN EMPIRICAL THEORIES OF COURTS 117, 135 
(K. Boyum & L. Mather eds. 1983) [hereinafter GALANTER, RADIATING EFFECTS]). 
113 See supra note 18 (referring to Professor King’s casting “liability” as a drain on free 
enterprise). 
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Here I go further, along with Galanter, to claim that it has furnished 
these two goods to the American public as well.  
A. Goods for Persons in Need of Legal Services 
1. Wealth   
That tort liability transfers wealth to individuals from business 
enterprises is a truism that needs little elaboration here.114  Following a 
loss occasioned by wrongful conduct, litigation shifts the cost of this loss 
between the parties.115  Proponents and opponents of liability agree on 
the point, as well as its converse:  Restrictions on liability transfer wealth 
to business enterprises from individuals.116  Even though most of the 
sums spent on lawsuits get classified as “transaction costs” and are 
deemed not to reach victims,117 hurt persons gain from litigation.  A hurt 
person can also achieve gains when retaining lawyers who, serving as 
agents, do not file lawsuits.118 
The establishment of an enterprise of liability—more powerful than 
its precursors in the plaintiffs’ bar—built wealth for persons in need of 
legal services.  The most thorough study of contemporary class actions, 
done by Rand in the late 1990s,119 attributes gains in wealth for plaintiffs 
to the development of an enterprise of liability.  One type of class action 
that delivers wealth to plaintiffs involves a claim where damages for 
each plaintiff are too low to justify a lawyer’s decision to represent one 
                                                 
114 A venerable truism: The Illinois Supreme Court adverted to it 135 years ago.  TXO 
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resource Co., 509 U.S. 443, 490-91 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Ill. Central R. Co. v. Welch, 52 Ill. 183, 188 (1869) (asserting that when determining 
damages, jurors treat railroad defendants unfairly)). 
115 Abel, supra note 55, at 1023. 
116 On the latter transfer, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars:  The Dilemma of the Mass Tort 
Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1348 n.15 (1995) (stating that tort reform “may 
produce a wealth transfer from plaintiffs to defendants”). 
117 Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment:  Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability 
Crisis,” and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 986-87 (2003) (considering transaction costs). 
118 See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert F. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents:  Cooperation and 
Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 512 (1994) (using game theory 
to show that “lawyers may allow clients to cooperate in circumstances when their clients 
could not do so on their own”).  The Gilson-Mnookin thesis, if credited—and, of course, if 
interpersonal strife is assumed to exist independent of a civil liability system—extends the 
benefits of “the enterprise of liability” to defendants and prospective defendants. 
119 DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS:  PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR 
PRIVATE GAIN (2000). 
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plaintiff; aggregation makes the lawsuit profitable.120  Each individual 
plaintiff collects little, but the class of plaintiffs gains wealth.  Another 
category of wealth creation is the turnaround made possible by resources 
Yeazell has described:  In the litigation over blood clotting products that 
injured hemophiliacs, for instance, the formation of a class turned a 
history of plaintiff defeats into a payout of about $620 million in 
compensation.121  As mentioned, the tobacco litigation is perhaps the 
most celebrated account of wealth accreted, not only for state 
governments but class members and individual litigants, only after the 
plaintiff’s bar became established as an enterprise.122  
2. Choice   
Tort-reform critics have seized “choice” for their side of the dispute, 
denouncing liability as antithetical to freedoms and prerogatives while 
conceding that it gives consumers and other individuals “wealth.” Yet 
the enterprise of liability has given plaintiffs more opportunities to 
pursue what they want.  Deborah Hensler and her Rand colleagues have 
refuted the notion that lawyers in class actions always manipulate, 
exploit, and control their clients,123 relating several detailed accounts of 
plaintiff choice.  Of the ten class actions that anchor Class Action 
Dilemmas, four started as individual litigation; in all but one of the ten, 
individuals initiated a search for legal assistance.124  In class actions and 
out of them, individuals have a choice whether to become plaintiffs.125  
Moreover, choice and wealth are not independent variables:  Because the 
enterprise of liability gives plaintiff-litigants more clout vis-a-vis the 
defense, they can acquire more of what they choose to pursue. 
B. Goods for a Wider Base 
Surely individuals, acting as customers, might include justice among 
the goods that they seek.  Justice is abstract, but so are the traits that 
Americans objectify in order to possess, sometimes by shelling out cash:  
                                                 
120 Id. at 279-83 (describing small individual recoveries in a multimillion-dollar class 
action for insurance company overcharges). 
121 Id. at 295-96, 310. 
122 REGULATING TOBACCO (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001). 
123 See Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 24 (referring to explorations of this 
belief in the context of securities litigation). 
124 HENSLER ET AL., supra note 119, at 403. 
125 See Abel, supra note 55, at 1022 (“No one, not even the plaintiffs’ bar, makes litigants 
sue.”).  I elaborate on this voluntarism in Bernstein, Muss es Sein?, supra note 73; Bernstein, 
Complaints, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 37 (2000); Bernstein & Fanning, Japan, supra note 42, at 59-
60. 
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beauty, youth, virility, femininity, a dose of cathartic laughter or 
weeping, and so on.  Law might be seen as a service industry, offering 
the service of delivering justice at a reasonable price.  Where are the 
rational-actor theorists who usually stand tall in defense of customer 
preferences?  Perhaps they remain seated to deny that tort law could be 
an object of customer preference.  It doesn’t look like a consumer good 
because it turns backward, effects redistribution, coerces the transfer of 
assets, and collides with property rights.  But a customer might want 
retribution, redistribution, and the ranking of a wrong (the tort) over 
some right (to hold assets).  The question of justice as something 
consumers prefer comes down to whether, on balance, tort law achieves 
improvement.126  
Ideals of free enterprise inform this question.  An earlier portion of 
this Article explored reasons to find that Americans endorse the 
enterprise of liability as citizens and participants in constitutional 
government, without reference to whether they participate in lawsuits.127  
To conclude this Part, here I ask about the wisdom of empowering that 
desire.  Does this broader clientele, which extends to nonlitigants and 
includes all citizens, gain wealth and choice from the enterprise of 
liability?  
1. Wealth   
When it effects compensation, tort liability transfers rather than 
creates wealth; if it can effect deterrence, however, tort liability does 
increase wealth by reducing the social cost of injury.  Members of the 
public do not gain wealth when money moves from one stranger’s 
pocket to another’s.128  From the perspective of our “broader clientele,” 
then, the wealth query will turn on whether liability encourages 
decisions that increase safety. 
This perennial question about deterrence of dangerous behaviors has 
remained open for a long time.  Gary Schwartz’s answer of “Yes, but not 
                                                 
126 Here I rely on the insights that John Goldberg has shared with me.  E-mail from John 
C.P. Goldberg, to Anita Bernstein (Jun. 21, 2004) (on file with author). 
127 See supra Part I.A. 
128 Alfred Conard argues that for the public, the outcome is actually worse: When 
enterprise liability imposes the costs of accidents on enterprises, individual malefactors 
escape responsibility; other “innocent contributors,” including customers and taxpayers, 
are forced to pay.  Transfers occasioned by tort liability are thus “subtractions from the 
food, clothing, and shelter of human beings that have played no part in the injuries that are 
compensated.”  Alfred F. Conard, Who Pays in the End for Injury Compensation?  Reflections 
on Wealth Transfers from the Innocent, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 283, 285 (1993). 
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that much” in response to his query, “Does tort law really deter?,” 
published ten years ago and supported by a range of measurements,129 
comes closest to a consensus:  Tort law does impose some deterrence.130  
One study of deterrence in the automobile industry describes automobile 
manufacturers as spurred to make investments in safety by a 
combination of litigation and phenomena that accompany litigation, 
including adverse publicity and the threat of new regulations.131  This 
description helps to refute the principal argument against liability-as-
deterrence—which concedes that deterrence may exist in a “subtly 
anthropomorphic” theoretical paradigm of business enterprise, but in 
practice, vicarious liability will defeat it132—by framing the effects of 
litigation as going beyond transfers of money and threats thereof.  Add 
to this pressure the relative weakness of non-litigation sources of 
potential deterrence—regulation and criminal prosecution—and liability 
becomes a source of wealth through deterrence of unsafe products and 
behaviors, albeit a modest one.133 
Beyond deterrence, the enterprise of liability helps to make 
regulation possible.  While most uses of the phrase “regulation through 
litigation” remain pejorative, a substantial literature applauds the 
phenomenon as integral to contemporary regulation.  In a classic 
dichotomy developed twenty years ago, Matthew McCubbins and 
Thomas Schwartz contrasted “fire alarms” to “police patrols” as 
                                                 
129 Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law:  Does Tort Law Really 
Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994). 
130 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 
10 (1987)  (concluding that “what empirical evidence there is indicates that tort law . . . 
deters”). 
131 John D. Graham, Product Liability and Motor Safety, in THE LIABILITY MAZE:  THE 
IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 120, 180-82 (Peter W. Huber & 
Robert E. Litan eds., 1991).  Other chapters in The Liability Maze conclude that tort law does 
indeed deter; some contend that it ought to be strengthened to achieve more deterrence.  
Robert S. Peck, Tort Reform’s Threat to an Independent Judiciary, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 835, 857-58 
(2002) (citations omitted). 
132 King, supra note 18, at 187 (quoting Louis Jaffe’s classic Damages for Personal Injury 
(1953)). 
133 It bears mention that, like “the free enterprise system,” “the enterprise of liability” 
need not create much wealth in order to earn recognition as having created some.  See supra 
note 118 and accompanying text.  Accordingly, then, Peter Huber’s criticism of liability as a 
source of unsafety—Huber argues that liability law is prejudiced against newer 
technologies, and in favor of the old, leaving the public saddled with, inter alia, the worse 
harms of wood stoves instead of the better harms of nuclear power Peter Huber, Safety and 
the Second Best:  The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 
302-03 (1985)—does not defeat the claim that liability is a source of wealth.  See infra Part V. 
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methods to effect legislative oversight.134  “Police patrols” refers to direct 
monitoring; by contrast “fire alarms,” or decentralized power-sharing, 
refers to the incentives that legislators can give to outsiders to help them 
keep track of misconduct.135  As competing means to reach the same end, 
fire alarms “can be both more effective” than police patrols “in that they 
cover more areas, and more efficient, in that the costs associated with 
oversight are borne by the empowered outside parties.”136  The 
enterprise of liability has caused new regulations to be written and 
enforced.137  “In sum,” as Peter Schuck describes the plaintiff’s bar, from 
his vantage point of a specialist on regulation, “an intricate and 
increasingly efficient private system generates, processes, disseminates, 
coordinates, and deploys most of the risk information that lawyers need 
to initiate mass tort litigation.  Personal, organizational, and professional 
incentives fuel this system—a blend of material gain, professional 
prestige, and ideology.”138 
2. Choice   
Legal scholars have argued that tort liability fosters choice among 
consumers and the public;139 Thomas Burke, as we have seen, identifies 
“litigious policymaking” as an American political choice.140  One might 
support this relatively abstract work with anecdotes about freedoms and 
prerogatives that the enterprise of liability has expanded.  Class Action 
Dilemmas, for instance, recounts several:  The story about the class action 
that began when an optometrist became angry about the defendant’s 
business practices and decided to try to do something about them,141 and 
                                                 
134 I thank Bill Buzbee for lending his expertise in administrative and regulatory law to 
this paragraph. 
135 Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:  
Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984). 
136 Kal Raustiala, The “Participatory Revolution” in International Environmental Law, 21 
HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 537, 562 (1997). 
137 Peck, supra note 131.  For example, before tort liability uncovered the danger of 
asbestos—a danger long known to the industry, and actively concealed—regulation and 
legislation had not acted against its toxic effects.  See PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS 
MISCONDUCT:  THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 89 (1985); David E. Lilienfeld, The Silence: 
The Asbestos Industry and Early Occupational Cancer Research—A Case Study, 81 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 791, 793 (1991). 
138 Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts:  An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. 
REV. 941, 952 (1995). 
139 Lucinda M. Finley, Female Trouble:  The Implications of Tort Reform for Women, 64 TENN. 
L. REV. 847, 849 (noting that tort liability can foster public awareness of risk and make 
consumer choices more informed); GALANTER, RADIATING EFFECTS, supra note 112. 
140 See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text. 
141 HENSLER ET AL., supra note 119, at 145-46, 149. 
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the spreading of settlement monies to a charity,142 are two examples.  Its 
chart, captioned “How the Ten Class Actions Affected Defendants’ 
Practices,” recites several enhancements of consumer choice:  better 
packaging, beneficial new regulation, more detailed disclosure, and an 
extended “grace period” in the consumer class actions; on the mass torts 
side, better screening for HIV as well as improved heat-treating of blood 
products; changes in design to eliminate a hazardous material from 
plumbing; and redesigns to make home siding less susceptible to water 
damage.143  Lawsuits alleging that fast-food establishments caused their 
customers to become unhealthy fostered change:  ridicule and 
immunizing legislation, indeed, and dismissals with prejudice,144 but 
also newer menus offering smaller and more healthful options.145   
What do stories like these tell us?  The “fire alarms” mentioned two 
paragraphs ago link with Thomas Burke’s constitutional theory to 
suggest that nonlitigants, as citizens, choose liability to achieve 
regulation and governance by the decentralized means they prefer.  This 
conclusion veers close to tautology, of course.  It would be an 
overstatement to say that Americans have the enterprise of liability 
because they asked for it, presumably in contrast to citizens in other 
nations who declined to ask for it.  Instead, I would locate “choice” in the 
regulation-through-litigation paradigm, a tradition that, as Burke writes, 
“leads Americans to favor litigation as a way of taming the powerful and 
punishing bad behavior without creating more government.”146  The 
paradigm fosters significant non-choice, to be sure—unreviewable 
decisions by unelected judges, unintended consequences, resources and 
options lost to foolish litigation—and yet the enterprise of liability is a 
veritable garden of individual autonomy and freedom when compared 
                                                 
142 Id. at 220-21. 
143 Id. at 431-33. 
144 In the spring of 2004 the House of Representatives passed a bill immunizing 
restaurants from obesity liability; the measure appears defunct in the Senate.  Alex Beam, A 
Super Size Portion of Half Truths, BOSTON GLOBE, May 11, 2004, at E1. 
145 Delroy Alexander, Court Tosses McDonald’s Health Suit; Chain Calls for Debate on 
Nutrition, CHI. TRIB., Sep. 5, 2003, at C1 (indicating the impact of “Big Food” litigation by 
noting that McDonald’s called for “a new national debate on nutrition and fitness”); Beam, 
supra note 144 (attributing fast-food menu changes to “legal wolves baying at the door”); 
see also Jeremy H. Rogers, Living on the Fat of the Land:  How to Have Your Burger and Sue It 
Too, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 859, 883 (2003) (speculating that if this litigation were encouraged, 
“Big Food may begin to create and advertise more healthy items in efforts to preclude 
further liability”). 
146 BURKE, supra note 60, at 203. 
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to its rival, tort reform, which works mainly to thwart plaintiffs’ 
initiatives.147   
V.  HOW GOOD A GOOD?  THREE OBJECTIONS, WITH BRIEF RESPONSES 
A. The Analogy to Extortion and Blackmail 
Distinguished jurists who have seen a resemblance between 
litigation and extortion or blackmail include Richard Posner, Milton 
Handler, Henry Friendly, and Frank Easterbrook, each of whom has 
expressed divergent concerns about the extortion-like potency of class 
certification.148  The metaphor has taken on the force of doctrine:  Courts 
have held that pressure on defendants to settle is “a recognized objection 
to class certification.”149  Class Action Dilemmas quotes testimony 
presented to the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules when the 
Committee was considering changes to Rule 23 in 1996; witnesses spoke 
about blackmail and extortion.150  The rise of an “enterprise of liability,” 
then, to some suggests augmented powers to extort, beyond class 
certification.  As Charles Silver has pointed out, this reasoning may be 
applied more widely to cover any settlement demand from a plaintiff.151 
Relying in part on the work of Mitchell Berman, Silver continues this 
line of thought to refute the charge of extortion and blackmail.  A 
defendant’s feeling pressured by a lawsuit or a settlement demand, he 
explains, is not the same as its being a victim of one of these crimes, even 
in their metaphorical sense.  The crux of blackmail and extortion—what 
makes them crimes, even though silence and revelation, the behaviors 
that the blackmailer or extorter proposes to do or not do, are usually 
                                                 
147 Id.  While critics of litigation in such debates voice a range of complaints–the 
uncertainty created by jury verdicts, the high transaction costs, the long delays common in 
adjudication–the main purpose of discouragement reforms is simply to discourage 
plaintiffs.  The rationale for many reforms is that many claims of plaintiffs are illegitimate.  
Yet most discouragement reforms–caps on damages are a particularly vivid example–fail to 
separate legitimate and illegitimate claims.  They just put a damper on all lawsuits.  BURKE, 
supra note 60, at 200. 
148 Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”:  Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1357, 1357 (2003) (identifying significant differences among the various analogies to 
blackmail). 
149 Id. at 1358 (citing cases). 
150 One source gathered several quotations from unnamed witnesses:  “The class action 
has become an opportunity for a kind of ‘legalized blackmail’.  The courts have described 
class actions as ‘judicial blackmail’ and, inducements to ‘blackmail settlements’ . . . .  [The 
class action] ‘has become a racket—that is the simple truth of it.”  HENSLER ET AL., supra 
note 119, at 33. 
151 Silver, supra note 148, at 1387-88. 
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legal—is an improper motive.  Seeking redress for injuries attributable to 
wrongful conduct does not evidence any impropriety.152      
B. Money Meets Justice 
Lawyer-economist Gillian Hadfield, beginning with the question of 
why lawyers charge so much, finds an issue in the unfortunate 
conjunction of money with “justice.”153  Not every would-be provider 
can take part in the enterprise of liability, Hadfield reminds us:  
Licensing rules and the crime of unauthorized practice of law exclude 
many who might otherwise offer lower prices for similar services, and 
thereby make the market more competitive.  The rationale for this 
monopoly is “justice,” a concept that lawyers see as antithetical to 
commerce and the market.  Yet rhetoric about justice does not deter most 
lawyers from the marketish practice of allowing money to determine 
how they will spend their professional time; they will reject a 
prospective client with a good justice-based claim if the work is not 
lucrative.  Hadfield sees the enterprise of liability as an unfair game of 
heads-we-win, tails-you-lose:  Suppliers define their occupation in 
idealistic, anti-commercial terms when they want to exclude competitors 
but favor a contrary, market-focused set of defining terms when they 
want to accrete money.154  Hadfield concludes by proposing to regulate 
the separation of justice from money:  She would withdraw from those 
lawyers who benefit from “justice”—that is, the majority in the 
profession who gain prestige or monopoly powers from rhetoric and 
norms that oppose the market—their prerogative to work for their 
highest bidders. 
Although this criticism can be read to deny the label of “enterprise” 
to any sector that refuses to play by the rules of an open market, and 
thus to declare “the enterprise of liability” to be a contradiction in 
terms—as absurd as “the market of justice”155—a more nuanced reading 
                                                 
152 Id. at 1386-89. 
153 Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law:  How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice 
System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953 (2000). 
154 Id. at 1005. 
155 Alabama lawyer Robert D. Shattuck, Jr. has circulated a petition that offers a version 
of this criticism.  Shattuck criticizes the plaintiffs’ bar, particularly the well-heeled tobacco 
lawyers, for pursuing profit the way a commercial enterprise does, while receiving 
“extremely excessive compensation” that, he argues, no enterprise in a real market would 
receive.  With respect to the plaintiffs’ bar, Shattuck finds “an absence of a regularly 
operating labor marketplace,” “no accountability to taxpayers/voters,” and judges and 
juries who neither spend “their own money” nor exercise “reasonable mindfulness about 
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of Hadfield is available.  Hadfield has revealed an enterprise that holds 
unique monopoly-like privileges, in exchange for which it may well be 
expected or compelled to forgo other privileges.  Just as private ordering, 
customer choices, administrative regulation, the rule of law, imperfect 
information, and a host of other phenomena limit what any for-profit 
business enterprise can do, the plaintiffs’ bar works under considerable 
constraint; and nothing in the construct of an enterprise of liability 
should prohibit regulators from constraining it more.   
C. The Criticism About Value 
The third objection to praising “the enterprise of liability” need be 
noted only briefly, as it applies to this entire Article:  Lawyers cannot be 
seen as the providers of any enterprise, because they create nothing of 
value.  This objection flourished during Japan’s economic boom of 
twenty years ago, when critics faulted the United States for its excessive 
investment in lawyers and litigation.  As Curtis Milhaupt and Mark West 
restate the point, nations and societies “have a choice:  they can either 
nurture engineers and other innovators who produce wealth or they can 
churn out lawyers and other rent seekers who will redistribute wealth 
and contribute to the complexity and adversarial nature of human 
interaction.”156  According to this view, the enterprise of liability creates 
either nothing (beyond mere shuffling of money from one pocket to 
another) or bad things like “complexity” and strife:  One might speak in 
the same tone about the enterprise of pollution, or the enterprise of 
organized crime.  This Article has presented a contrary picture of 
expansions in wealth and choice.  The picture joins a larger one that 
depicts lawyers as instrumental to value creation.157     
VI.  CONCLUSION:   ON BEING ENOUGH OF AN ENTERPRISE 
The phrases “enterprise liability” and “the free enterprise system,” I 
have contended, advert to gains in welfare without giving credit to the 
facilitators that make these gains possible.  A complementary phrase 
would extend the word “enterprise” to an institution that helps to 
bestow the two gifts of a free enterprise system, wealth and choice, on 
injured persons and the general public.  Robust tort liability not only 
                                                                                                             
the compensation that their actions award to plaintiffs’ lawyers.”  E-mail from Robert D. 
Shattuck, Jr., to Anita Bernstein (Sept. 10, 2004) (on file with author). 
156 Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, Law’s Dominion and the Market for Legal Elites in 
Japan, 34 LAW & POL. INT’L BUS. 451, 452 (2003). 
157 Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers:  Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 
YALE L.J. 239 (1984); Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 118. 
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creates wealth and choice but also—as visiting Cuba revealed to me—
signifies both of these goods.  It is a banner of prosperity and freedom. 
The claim about freedom may warrant a cautionary note here.  
Consider one illustration of how liability might indeed reduce rather 
than expand freedom expressed as consumer choice.  Some products—
vaccines are the tort-reformer’s favorite example—disappear from the 
market, and their manufacturers attribute the withdrawal decision to the 
cost of liability.  Dare I speak of wealth and choice when, back in a pre-
crisis idyll, vaccines flourished abundantly?158  I dare.  I am emboldened 
by the fact that “the free enterprise system,” juxtaposed next to “the 
enterprise of liability” here to show their common ground, reduces as 
well as increases welfare.  
Free enterprise demonstrably fosters wealth and choice, as Robert 
McTeer of the Federal Reserve Bank and others have shown.159  But it 
also drives competitors out of business, imposes a monolithic neoliberal 
model on the world’s nations that would have otherwise evidenced more 
variation in their economic policies, reduces the strength of socialism 
and protectionism and other economic alternatives, and paradoxically 
might bestow too many choices on consumers—than they want.  Because 
free enterprise does not, pace Pareto, leave everyone better off, the 
enterprise of liability is not necessarily inferior if it does not increase 
choice at every turn.  
Just as the ideology of free enterprise fails to leave everyone better 
off, the entity regarded today as most entitled to call itself “enterprise”—
the contemporary American business corporation—fails to live up to the 
wealth-and-choice ideal.  For more than a century, numerous corporate 
decisions have demonstrably smothered wealth and choice.  Governed 
by what business scholars Shoshana Zuboff and James Maxmin call 
                                                 
158 This blissful idyll may never have existed, but vaccine supplies have indeed become 
constricted in the United States—not only because manufacturers have withdrawn from 
the market citing liability concerns, but for less dramatic reasons as well: temporary 
shutdowns to maintain or upgrade manufacturing plants, and management decisions not 
to invest in new production facilities.  Lars Noah, Triage in the Nation’s Medicine Cabinet:  
The Puzzling Scarcity of Vaccines and Other Drugs, 54 S.C. L. REV. 741, 743-45 (2003).  While 
this Article was going to press in late fall 2004, a recurrence of this type of national crisis—a 
shortage of influenza vaccine—was in full force.  See HDC Research:  Majority of Physicians 
Say Flu Vaccine Shortage Is Crisis, E-Survey Shows, BIOTECH L. WEEKLY, Nov. 26, 2004 
(available at LEXIS) (reporting that 95% of physicians agreed that “crisis” accurately 
described the flu vaccine shortage). 
159 See supra Part I.A. 
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“organizational narcissism,”160 American businesses have foregone 
millions of dollars of wealth they could have earned, and deprived 
consumers of countless chances to express their wishes.  Zuboff and 
Maxmin, after recounting in painful detail several examples of multi-
million dollars lost when business refused to heed consumers’ wishes, 
sum up what they call “the standard enterprise logic,” a tangle of 
pernicious notions that they hope will be abandoned:  
The standard enterprise logic expresses the social 
realities of the early twentieth century:  the emphasis on 
the mass; the elitism and threatened masculinity that led 
to a sexualized contempt for end consumers, enforced 
their lack of voice, fixed their distance from producers, 
and supported the tendency to extol male producers as 
the creators of value over female consumers as the 
destroyers of value; the romance with products and 
technology; the faith in ‘systems’ and science that led to 
an emphasis on control, centralization, and bureaucracy; 
the vast disparities in education that were used to 
underscore and legitimate the need for a managerial 
hierarchy.161  
Those for whom a Harvard Business School-authored tome is too 
opaque will find in any daily newspaper specifics on how the 
contemporary American business corporation veers from the ideals of 
free enterprise.  Taxpayer-funded bailouts, stock options given as 
compensation (rather than stock, that is, and unexpensed to boot), 
astronomical pay for officers and directors whether they perform well or 
poorly, Enron-style looting of retirement funds to impoverish workers 
and enrich the executive suite, corporate governance without 
measurement or rational incentives, federal subsidies to inefficient and 
insignificant industries, and the ongoing resistance to transparency in 
publicly traded corporations are just a handful of the available 
examples.162  Here my purpose is not to fire a cheap shot at modern 
                                                 
160 SHOSHANA ZUBOFF & JAMES MAXMIN, THE SUPPORT ECONOMY:  WHY CORPORATIONS 
ARE FAILING INDIVIDUALS AND THE NEXT EPISODE OF CAPITALISM (2002). 
161 Id. at 285. 
162 One more example from the multitude: The most famous company in my city of 
residence received strong criticism in a New York Times editorial.  Another Coke Classic, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2004, at A20 (faulting the Coca-Cola board for having paid “more than 
$200 million in recent years to departing executives” who had presided over the company’s 
declining fortunes).  For readable books on the subject published last year, see ARIANNA 
HUFFINGTON, PIGS AT THE TROUGH:  HOW CORPORATE GREED AND POLITICAL CORRUPTION 
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American business but to suggest that no contemporary institution or 
sector has ever delivered unmitigated wealth and choice to American 
citizens. 
Among those institutional actors that might claim to stand for ideals 
of “the free enterprise system,” then, the plaintiffs’ bar compares 
favorably to all other sectors of the contemporary United States, 
including the main pretender to this throne, the business corporation.  
The plaintiffs’ lawyers hustle in behalf of their clientele—working for 
injured persons in particular and the American public in general—to 
increase material wealth and augment individuals’ powers to choose.  
We who esteem free enterprise ought to esteem the enterprise of liability. 
                                                                                                             
ARE UNDERMINING AMERICA (2003) (recounting anecdotes of greed and shortsightedness in 
American business); PAUL R. KRUGMAN, THE GREAT UNRAVELING:  LOSING OUR WAY IN THE 
NEW CENTURY (2003) (reviewing corporate scandals and linking them to the Bush 
administration). 
Bernstein: The Enterprise of Liability
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004
